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Abstract
We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoﬀs as the
discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but
not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players’) equilibrium
payoﬀs is independent of the state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain
induced by any Markov strategy proﬁle is irreducible. We then provide conditions under
which a folk theorem obtains: if in each state the joint distribution over the public signal
and next period’s state satisﬁes some rank condition, every feasible payoﬀ vector above the
minmax payoﬀ is sustained by a perfect public equilibrium with low discounting.
Keywords: stochastic games.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic games are diﬃcult to solve. In repeated games, ﬁnding some equilibrium is easy,
as any repetition of a stage-game Nash equilibrium will do. This is not the case in stochastic
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1games. Even the most basic equilibria for such games, namely (stationary) Markov equilibria, in
which continuation strategies depend on the current state only, often turn out to be challenging.
Further complications arise once the assumption of perfect monitoring is abandoned. In that case,
our understanding of equilibria in repeated games owes an invaluable debt to Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1990), whose recursive techniques have found numerous applications. Parallel ideas
have been developed in stochastic games by Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987, 1991) to establish
the most general equilibrium existence results to date (see also Solan, 1998). Those ideas have
triggered a development of numerical methods (Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin, 2003), whose use is
critical for applications in which postulating a high discount factor appears too restrictive.
In repeated games, more tractable characterizations have been achieved in the case of low
discounting. Fudenberg and Levine (1994, hereafter FL) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994, hereafter FLM) show that the set of (perfect public) equilibrium payoﬀs can be character-
ized by a family of static constrained optimization programs. Based on this and other insights,
they derive suﬃcient conditions for a folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring. The algorithm developed by FL has proved to be useful, as it allows to identify the
equilibrium payoﬀ set in interesting cases in which the suﬃcient conditions for the folk theorem
fail. This is the case, for instance, in the partnership game of Radner, Myerson and Maskin
(1986). Most importantly, FL’s algorithm can accommodate both long-run and short-run play-
ers, which is essential for many applications, especially in macroeconomics and political economy,
in which consumers or voters are often modeled as non-strategic (see Mailath and Samuelson,
2006, Chapters 5 and 6).
This paper extends these results to stochastic games. More precisely, it provides an algorithm
that characterizes the set of perfect public equilibria in stochastic games with ﬁnite states,
signals and actions, in which states are observed, monitoring is imperfect but public, under the
assumption that the limiting set of equilibrium payoﬀs (of the long-run players) is independent
of the initial state (this is the case, in particular, if the Markov chain over states deﬁned by
any Markov strategy proﬁle is irreducible). This algorithm is a natural extension of FL, and
indeed, reduces to it if there is only one state. The key to this characterization lies in the linear
constraints to impose on continuation payoﬀs. In FL, each optimization program is indexed by a
direction λ ∈ RI that speciﬁes the weights on the payoﬀs of the I players. Trivially, the boundary
point v of the equilibrium payoﬀ set that maximizes this weighted average in the direction λ is
such that, for any realized signal y, the continuation payoﬀ w(y) must satisfy the property that
2λ (w(y)−v) ≤ 0. Indeed, one of the main insights of FL is that, once discounting is suﬃciently
low, attention can be restricted to this linear constraint, for each λ, so that the program itself
becomes linear in w, and hence considerably more tractable. In a stochastic game, it is clear
that the continuation payoﬀ must be indexed not only by the public signal, but also by the
realized state, and since the stage games that correspond to the current and to the next state
need not be the same, there is little reason to expect this property to be preserved for each pair
of states. Indeed, it is not. One might then wonder whether the resulting problem admits a
linear characterization at all. The answer is aﬃrmative.
When all players are long-run, this characterization can be used to establish a folk theorem
under assumptions that parallel those invoked by FLM. In stochastic games, note that state
transitions might be aﬀected by actions taken, so that, because states are observed, they already
provide information about players’ past actions. Therefore, it is natural to impose rank conditions
at each state on how actions aﬀect the joint distribution over the future state and signal. This
is weaker than requiring such conditions on signals alone, and indeed, it is easy to construct
examples where the folk theorem holds without any public signals (see Sections 3.2 and 5).
This folk theorem also generalizes Dutta’s (1995) folk theorem for stochastic games with per-
fect monitoring. Unlike ours, Dutta’s ingenious proof is constructive, extending ideas developed
by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for the case of repeated games with perfect monitoring. How-
ever, his assumptions (except for the monitoring structure) are the same as ours. In independent
and simultaneous work, Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) provide a diﬀerent, direct proof of the
folk theorem for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring under irreducibility, without
a general characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set. Their rank assumptions are stronger, as
discussed in Section 5.
Finally, our results also imply the average cost optimality equation from dynamic program-
ming, which obtains here as a special case where there is a single player. The average cost
optimality equation is widely used in operations research, for instance in routing, inventory,
scheduling and queuing problems, and our results might thus prove useful for game-theoretic
extensions of such problems, as in inventory or queuing games.
Of course, stochastic games are also widely used in economics. They play an important
role in industrial organization (among many others, see Ericson and Pakes, 1995). It is hoped
that methods such as ours might help provide integrated analyses of questions whose treatment
had to be conﬁned to simple environments so far, such as the role of imperfect monitoring
3(Green and Porter, 1984) and of business cycles (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) in collusion, for
instance. Rigidities and persistence play an important role in macroeconomics as well, giving
rise to stochastic games. See Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), for example. In Section 6, we shall
apply our results to a simple political economy game, and establish a version of the folk theorem
when some players are short-run.
2 Notation and Assumptions
We introduce stochastic games with public signals. At each stage, the game is in one state,
and players simultaneously choose actions. Nature then stochastically determines the current
reward (or ﬂow payoﬀ) proﬁle, the next state and a public signal, as a function of the current
state and the action proﬁle. The sets S of possible states, I of players, Ai of actions available to
player i, and Y of public signals are assumed ﬁnite.1
Given an action proﬁle a ∈ A := ×iAi and a state s ∈ S, we denote by r(s,a) ∈ RI the
reward proﬁle in state s given a, and by p(t,y|s,a) the joint probability of moving to state t ∈ S
and of getting the public signal y ∈ Y . (As usual, we can think of ri(s,a) as the expectation
given a of some realized reward that is a function of a private outcome of player i and the public
signal only).
We assume that at the end of each period, the only information publicly available to all players
consists of nature’s choices: the next state together with the public signal. When properly
interpreting Y , this includes the case of perfect monitoring and the case of publicly observed
rewards. Note however that this fails to include the case where actions are perfectly monitored,
yet states are not disclosed. In such a case, the natural “state” variable is the (common) posterior
belief of the players on the underlying state.
Thus, in the stochastic game, in each period n = 1,2,..., the state is observed, the stage game
is played, and the corresponding public signal is then revealed. The stochastic game is parame-
terized by the initial state s1, and it will be useful to consider all potential initial states simulta-
neously. The public history at the beginning of period n is then hn = (s1,y1,...,sn−1,yn−1,sn).
We set H1 := S, the set of initial states. The set of public histories at the beginning of period
n is therefore Hn := (S × Y )n−1 × S, and we let H :=
 
n≥1 Hn denote the set of all public
histories. The private history for player i at the beginning of period n is a sequence hi
n =
1For notational convenience, the set of available actions is independent of the state. See, however, footnote
11. All results extend beyond that case.
4(s1,ai
1,y1,...,sn−1,ai
n−1,yn−1,sn), and we similarly deﬁne Hi
1 := S, Hi




n. Given a stage n ≥ 1, we denote by sn the state, an the realized action
proﬁle, and yn the public signal in period n. We will often use the same notation to denote both
these realizations and the corresponding random variables.
A (behavior) strategy for player i ∈ I is a map σi : Hi → ∆(Ai). Every pair of initial state
s1 and strategy proﬁle σ generates a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way
and thus also generates a distribution over sequences of the players’ rewards. Players seek to
maximize their payoﬀ, that is, the average discounted sum of their rewards, using a common
discount factor δ < 1. Thus, the payoﬀ of player i ∈ I if the initial state is s1 and the players






We shall consider a special class of equilibria. A strategy σi is public if it depends on the
public history only, and not on the private information. That is, a public strategy is a mapping
σi : H → ∆(Ai). A perfect public equilibrium (hereafter, PPE) is a proﬁle of public strategies
such that, given any period n and public history hn, the strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium from
that period on. Note that this class of equilibria includes Markov equilibria, in which strategies
only depend on the current state and period. In what follows though, a Markov strategy for
player i will be a public strategy that is a function of states only, i.e. a function S → ∆(Ai).2
Note also that the set of PPE payoﬀs is a function of the current state only, and does not
otherwise depend on the public history, nor on the period. Perfect public equilibria are sequential
equilibria, but it is easy to construct examples showing that the converse is not generally true.
What we characterize, therefore, is a subset of the sequential equilibrium payoﬀs.
We denote by Eδ(s) ⊂ R
I the (compact) set of PPE payoﬀs of the game with initial state
s ∈ S and discount factor δ < 1. All statements about convergence of, or equality between sets
are understood in the sense of the Hausdorﬀ distance d(A,B) between sets A, B.
Because both state and action sets are ﬁnite, it follows from Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1964)
that a (perfect public) equilibrium always exists in this set-up.
Our main result does not apply to all ﬁnite stochastic games. Some examples of stochastic
games, in particular those involving absorbing states, exhibit remarkably complex asymptotic
2In the literature on stochastic games, such strategies are often referred to as stationary strategies.
5properties. See, for instance, Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) or Sorin (1986). We shall come back
to the implications of our results for such games. Our main theorem makes use of the following
assumption.




This is an assumption on endogenous variables. A stronger assumption on exogenous variables
that implies Assumption A is irreducibility: For any pure Markov strategy proﬁle (as)s∈S ∈ AS,
the Markov chain over S with transition function
q(t|s) := p({t} × Y |s,as)
is irreducible. Actually, it is not necessary that every Markov strategy gives rise to an irreducible
Markov chain. It is clearly suﬃcient if there is some state that is accessible from every other
state regardless of the Markov strategy.
Another class of games that satisfy Assumption A, although they do not satisfy irreducibility,
is the class of alternating-move games (see Lagunoﬀ and Matsui, 1997 and Yoon, 2001). With
two players, for instance, such a game can be modeled as a stochastic game in which the state
space is A1 ∪ A2, where ai ∈ Ai is the state that corresponds to the last action played by player
i, when it is player −i’s turn to move. (Note that this implies perfect monitoring by deﬁnition,
as states are observed.)
Note also that, by redeﬁning the state space to be S × Y , one may further assume that only
states are disclosed. That is, the class of stochastic games with public signals is no more general
than the class of stochastic games in which only the current state is publicly observed. However,
the Markov chain over S × Y with transition function ˜ q(t,z|s,y) := p(t,z|s,as) need not be
irreducible even if q is.
63 An Algorithm to Compute Equilibrium Payoﬀs
3.1 Preliminaries: Repeated Games
As our results generalize the algorithm of FL, it is useful to start with a reminder of their
results, and examine, within a speciﬁc example, what diﬃculties a generalization to stochastic
games raises.
Recall that the set of (perfect public) equilibrium payoﬀs must be a ﬁxed point of the Bellman-
Shapley operator (see Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990). Deﬁne the one-shot game Γδ(w),
where w : Y → RI, with action sets Ai and payoﬀ




Note that if v is an equilibrium payoﬀ vector of the repeated game, associated with action proﬁle
α and continuation payoﬀ vectors w(y), as a function of the initial signal, then α must be a Nash
equilibrium of Γδ(w), with payoﬀ v. Conversely, if we are given a function w such that w(y) ∈ Eδ
for all y, and a Nash equilibrium α of Γδ(w) with payoﬀ v, then we can construct an equilibrium
of the repeated game with payoﬀ v in which the action proﬁle α is played in the initial period.
Therefore, the analysis of the repeated game can be reduced to that of the one-shot game.
The constraint that the continuation payoﬀ lies in the (unknown) set Eδ complicates the analysis
signiﬁcantly. FL’s key observation is that this constraint can be replaced by linear constraints
for the sake of asymptotic analysis (as δ → 1). If v ∈ Eδ is an equilibrium payoﬀ of the one-shot
game Γδ(w), then, subtracting δv on both sides and dividing through by 1 − δ,












Thus, provided that the equilibrium payoﬀ set is convex, v is also in E˜ δ for all ˜ δ > δ, because we
can use as continuation payoﬀ vectors ˜ w(y) the re-scaled vectors w(y) (see Figure 1). Conversely,
provided that the normal vector to the boundary of Eδ varies continuously with the boundary
point, then any set of payoﬀ vectors w(y) that lie in one of the half-spaces deﬁned by this normal

















Figure 1: Continuation payoﬀs as a function of the discount factor
for discount factors close enough to one. In particular, if we seek to identify the payoﬀ v that
maximizes λ   v on Eδ for δ close enough to 1, given λ ∈ RI, it suﬃces to compute the score
k(λ) := sup
x,v
λ   v,
such that v be a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the game Γ(x) whose payoﬀ function is given by
(2), and subject to the linear constraints λ   x(y) ≤ 0 for all y. Note that the discount factor no
longer appears in this program. We thus obtain a half-space H(λ) := {v ∈ RI : λ   v ≤ k(λ)}
containing limδ→1 Eδ.
This must be true for all vectors λ ∈ RI. Let H :=
 
λ∈RI H(λ). It follows, under appropriate
dimensionality assumptions, that the equilibrium payoﬀ set can be obtained as the intersection




































Figure 2: Rewards and Transitions in Example 1
3.2 A Stochastic Game
Our purpose is to come up with an algorithm for stochastic games that would generalize FL’s
algorithm. To do so, we must determine the appropriate constraints on continuation payoﬀs. Let
us attempt to adapt FL’s arguments to a speciﬁc example
There are two states, i = 1,2, and two players. Each player only takes an action in his
own state: player i chooses L or R in state i. Actions are not observable (Y = ∅), but aﬀect
transitions, so that players learn about their opponents’ actions via the evolution of the state. If
action L (R) is taken in state i, then the next state is again i with probability pL (pR). Let us
pick here pL = 1−pR = 1/10. Rewards are given in Figure 2 (transition probabilities to states 1
and 2, respectively, are given in parenthesis). Throughout, we refer to this game as Example 1.
Player i has a higher reward in state j  = i, independently of the action. Moreover, by playing
L, which yields him the higher reward in his own state, he maximizes the probability to switch
states. Thus, playing the eﬃcient action R requires intertemporal incentives, which are hard
to provide absent public signals. Constructing an equilibrium in which L is not always played
appears challenging, but not impossible: playing R in state i if and only if the state was j  = i in
the previous two periods (or since the beginning of the game if fewer periods have elapsed) is an
equilibrium for some high discount factor (δ ≈ .823). So there exist equilibrium payoﬀs above 1.
In analogy with (1), we may now decompose the payoﬀ vector in state s = 1,2 as




9where t is the next state, wt(s) is the continuation payoﬀ then, and p(t|s,as) is the probability of
transiting from s to t given action as at state s. Fix λ ∈ RI. If vs maximizes the score λ vs in all
states s = 1,2, then the continuation payoﬀ in state t gives a lower score than vt, independently
of the initial state: for all t,
λ   (wt(s) − vt) ≤ 0. (4)
Our goal is to eliminate the discount factor. Note, however, that if we subtract δvs on both sides
of (3), and divide by 1 − δ, we obtain






(wt(s) − vs), (5)
and there is no reason to expect λ  (wt(s) −vs) to be negative, unless s = t (compare with (4)).
Unlike the set of limiting payoﬀs as δ → 1, the set of feasible rewards does depend on the state
(in state 1, it is the segment [(1,1),(0,3)]; in state 2, the segment [(1,1),(3,0)]; see right panel
of Figure 2), and so the score λ   wt(s) in state t might exceed the maximum score achieved by





we know that λ   xs(s) ≤ 0, for all s, but not the sign of λ   xt(s), t  = s. On the one hand, we
cannot restrict it to be negative: if λ x2(1) ≤ 0, then, because also λ x1(1) ≤ 0, by considering
λ = (1,0), player 1’s payoﬀ starting from state 1 cannot exceed his highest reward in that state
(i.e., 1). Yet we know that some equilibria yield strictly higher payoﬀs. On the other hand, if
we impose no restrictions on xt(s), s  = t, then we can set vs as high as we wish in (5) by picking
xt(s) large enough. The value of the program to be deﬁned would be unbounded. What is the
missing constraint?
We do know that (4) holds for all pairs (s,t). By adding up these inequalities for (s,t) = (1,2)
and (2,1), we obtain
λ   (w1(2) + w2(1) − v1 − v2) ≤ 0, or, rearranging, λ   (x1(2) + x2(1)) ≤ 0. (6)
Equation (6) has a natural interpretation in terms of s-blocks, as deﬁned in the literature on
Markov chains (see, for instance, Nummelin, 1984). When the Markov chain (induced by the
players’ strategies) is communicating, as it is in our example, we might divide the game into the
10subpaths of the chain between consecutive visits to a given state s. The score achieved by the
continuation payoﬀ once state s is re-visited on the subpath (s1,...,sL) (where s1 = sL = s)
cannot exceed the score achieved by vs, and so the diﬀerence in these scores, as measured by the
sum
 L−1
l=1 λ xsl+1(sl), must be negative. Note that the irreducibility assumption also guarantees
that the limit set of feasible payoﬀs F (as δ → 1) is independent of δ, as shown in the right panel
of Figure 2.3
To conclude, we obtain the program
sup
α,x,v
λ   v,
over payoﬀ vectors v ∈ R2, α = (αs)s=1,2, and {xs(t) ∈ R2 : s,t = 1,2} such that, in each state
s, αs is a Nash equilibrium of the game with payoﬀ r(s,a) +
 
t p(t|s,a)xt(s), and such that
λ   x1(1) ≤ 0,λ   x2(2) ≤ 0, and λ   (x1(2) + x2(1)) ≤ 0. Note that this program already factors
in our assumption that equilibrium payoﬀs can be taken to be independent of the state.
It will follow from the main theorem of the next section that this is the right program.
Perhaps it is a little surprising that the constraints involve unweighted sums of vectors xt(s),
rather than, say, sums that are weighted by the invariant measure under the equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 1 below will provide a link between the constraints and such sums. What should come
as no surprise, though, is that generalizing these constraints to more than two states will involve
considering all cycles, or permutations, over states (see constraint (ii) below).
3.3 The Characterization
Given a state s ∈ S and a map x : S × Y → RS×I, we denote by Γ(s,x) the one-shot game







where xt(s,y) ∈ RI is the t-th component of x(s,y).
3This set can be computed by considering randomizations over pure Markov strategies, see Dutta (1995),
Lemma 1.
11Given λ ∈ RI, we denote by P(λ) the maximization program
supλ   v,
where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ RI and x : S × Y → RS×I such that
(i) For each s, v is a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the game Γ(s,x);
(ii) For each T ⊆ S, for each permutation φ : T → T and each map ψ : T → Y , one has
λ  
 
s∈T xφ(s)(s,ψ(s)) ≤ 0.
Denote by k(λ) ∈ [−∞,+∞] the value of P(λ). We will prove that the feasible set of P(λ)
is non-empty, so that k(λ) > −∞ (Proposition 1), and that the value of P(λ) is ﬁnite, so that
k(λ) < +∞ (Section 3.4).
We deﬁne H(λ) := {v ∈ RI : λ v ≤ k(λ)}, and set H :=
 
λ∈RI H(λ). Note that H is convex.
Let S1 denote the set of λ ∈ RI of norm 1.4 Observe that H(0) = RI, and that H(λ) = H(cλ)
for every λ ∈ RI and c > 0. Hence H is also equal to
 
λ∈S1 H(λ).
Our main result is a generalization of FL’s algorithm to compute the limit set of payoﬀs as
δ → 1.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem) Assume that H has non-empty interior. Under Assumption A,
Eδ(s) converges to H as δ → 1, for any s ∈ S.
Note that, with one state only, our optimization program reduces to the algorithm of FL.
The proof of Theorem 1 is organized in two propositions, stated below and proved in appendix.
Note that these propositions do not rely on Assumption A.
Proposition 1 For every δ < 1, we have the following.




We note that it need not be the case that Eδ(s) ⊆ H for each s ∈ S.
Proposition 2 Assume that H has non-empty interior, and let Z be any compact set contained
in the interior of H. Then Z ⊆ Eδ(s), for every s ∈ S and δ large enough.
4Throughout, we use the Euclidean norm.
12The logic of the proof of Proposition 2 is inspired by FL and FLM, but diﬀers in some impor-
tant respects. We here give a short and overly simpliﬁed account of the proof, that nevertheless
contains some basic insights.
Let a payoﬀ vector v ∈ Z, and a direction λ be given. Since v is interior to H, one has
λ   v < k(λ), and there thus exists x = (xt(s,y)) such that v is a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the
one-shot game Γ(s,x), and all inequality constraints on x hold with a strict inequality.
For high δ, we use x to construct equilibrium continuation payoﬀs w adapted to v in the
discounted game, with the interpretation that xt(s,y) is the normalized (continuation) payoﬀ
increment, should (t,y) occur. Since we have no control over the sign of λ   xt(s,y), the one-
period argument that is familiar from repeated games does not extend to stochastic games. To
overcome this issue, we will instead rely on large blocks of stages of ﬁxed size. Over such a block,
and thanks to the inequalities (ii) satisﬁed by x, we will prove that the sum of payoﬀ increments
is negative. This in turn will ensure that the continuation payoﬀ at the end of the block is below
v in the direction λ.






This statement applies to all ﬁnite stochastic games with observable states and full-dimensional
H, whether they satisfy Assumption A or not. Theorem 1 then follows, given Assumption A.
3.4 Finiteness of P(λ)
It is instructive, and useful for the sequel, to understand why the value of P(λ) is ﬁnite, for
each possible choice of λ. To see this, we rely on the next lemma, which we also use at other
places.
Lemma 1 Let q be an irreducible transition function over a ﬁnite set R, with invariant measure
µ. Then, for each ∅  = T ⊆ R, and every one-to-one map φ : T → T, there is πT,φ ≥ 0, such















where the sum ranges over all one-to-one maps φ : T → T.
13In words, for any payoﬀ increments (xt(s)), the expectation of these increments (with respect
to the invariant measure) is equal to some ﬁxed conical combination of their sum over cycles.
This provides a link between the constraints (i) and (ii).
Proof. We exploit an explicit formula for µ, due to Freidlin and Wentzell (1991). Given
a state s ∈ R, an s-graph is a directed graph g with vertex set R, and with the following two
properties:
• any state t  = s has outdegree one, while s has outdegree zero;
• the graph g has no cycle.
Equivalently, for any t  = s, there is a unique longest path starting from t, and this path ends
in s. We identify such a graph with its set of edges. The weight of any such graph g is deﬁned
to be q(g) :=
 



























Let Ω be the set of triples (s,g,t), such that g ∈ G(s). Deﬁne an equivalence relation ∼ over Ω
by (s,g,t) ∼ (s′,g′,t′) if g ∪ {(s → t)} = g′ ∪ {(s′ → t′)}. Observe that for each (s,g,t) ∈ Ω,
the graph g ∪ {(s → t)} has exactly one cycle (which contains s → t), and all vertices of S have
outdegree 1.
Let C ⊆ Ω be any equivalence class for ∼. Let s1 → s2 →     → sk → s1 denote the unique,
common, cycle of all (s,g,t) ∈ C. Deﬁne T := {s1,...,sk}, and denote by φ : T → T the map
which associates to any state u ∈ T its successor in the cycle.
Observe that the product q(g)q(t|s) is independent of (s,g,t) ∈ C, and we denote it ρC
T,φ. It









14The result follows by summation over equivalence classes.
Fix a direction λ ∈ RI. To show that the value of P is ﬁnite, take any feasible point (v,x)
in P(λ) and a Markov strategy α = (αs) such that, for each s ∈ S, αs is a Nash equilibrium of
Γ(s,x), with payoﬀ v. Let R ⊆ S be an arbitrary recurrent set of the Markov chain induced by
α, and denote by µ ∈ ∆(R) the invariant measure over R. For each s,t ∈ R, let f(s,t) be a
signal y that maximizes λ xt(s,y), and denote q(t|s) = p({t}×Y |s,αs). Then Lemma 1 implies
that
λ   v ≤ λ  
 
s∈R


























for some πT,φ ≥ 0, each ∅  = T ⊆ R and each one-to-one map φ : T → T.
4 Connection to Known Results
Our characterization includes as special cases the characterization obtained by FL for repeated
games, as well as the average cost optimality equation from dynamic programming in the case
of one player. In this section, we explain these connections in more detail.
4.1 Another Generalization of FL’s Algorithm
The speciﬁc form of the optimization program P(λ) is intriguing, and calls for some discussion.
We here elaborate upon Section 3.2. For simplicity, we assume full monitoring.
Perhaps a natural generalization of FL’s algorithm to a stochastic set-up would have been the
following. Given a direction λ ∈ RI, and for each initial state s ∈ S, consider the highest PPE
payoﬀ vs ∈ RI in the direction λ, when starting from s. Again, for each initial state s, there is
a mixed proﬁle αs, and continuation PPE payoﬀs wt(s,a), to be interpreted as the continuation
payoﬀ in the event that the next state turns out to be t, and such that:




(b) For any two states s,t ∈ S, and any action proﬁle a ∈ A, λ   wt(s,a) ≤ λ   vt.
Mimicking FL’s approach, we introduce the program, denoted ˜ P(λ,δ), supmins λ   vs, where
the supremum is taken over all ((vs),w,α) such that (a) and (b) hold.5 As we discussed in
Section 3.2, and unlike in the repeated game framework, the value of ˜ P(λ,δ) does depend on δ.
The reason is that, when setting xt(s,a) = δ
1−δ(wt(s,a)−vs), the inequality λ xt(s,a) ≤ 0 need
not hold (note that xt(s,a) involves wt(s,a) and vs, while (b) involves wt(s,a) and vt).
To obtain a program that does not depend on δ, we relax the program ˜ P(λ,δ) as follows.
Observe that, for any sequence s1,...,sk of states such that sk = s1, and for each aj ∈ A



























where the second equality holds since s1 = sk, and the ﬁnal inequality holds by (b). These are
precisely the averaging constraints which appear in our linear program P(λ).
That is, the program P(λ) appears as a discount-independent relaxation of the program
˜ P(λ,δ).6 This immediately raises the issue of whether this is a “meaningful” relaxation of the
program. We here wish to suggest that this is the case, by arguing somewhat informally that
the two programs P(λ) and ˜ P(λ,δ) have asymptotically the same value, as δ → 1. To show
this claim, we start with a feasible point (v,x,α) in P(λ), and we construct a feasible point
((vs),w,α) in ˜ P(λ,δ) such that vs − v is of the order of (1 − δ)c for each s ∈ S and some real
number c.7
5Taking the minimum (or maximum) over s in the objective function has no eﬀect asymptotically under
Assumption A. We choose the minimum for the convenience of the discussion.
6Note that ((vs),x) does not deﬁne a feasible point in P(λ), since feasibility in P(λ) requires that payoﬀs from
diﬀerent initial states coincide. This is straightforward to ﬁx. Let ¯ s be a state that minimizes λ  vs. Set v := v¯ s,
and ¯ xt(s,a) := xt(s,a) + v¯ s − vs for each s,a,t. Then (v, ¯ x) is a feasible point in P(λ).
7Since the constant c depends on x, this does not exactly suﬃce to prove our claim. Plainly, the discussion
below is not meant to be a substitute for a proof of Theorem 1.
16To keep the discussion straightforward, we assume that transitions are independent of ac-
tions.8 Set ﬁrst ˜ wt(s,a) := v + 1−δ
δ xt(s,a). Note that, for each state s ∈ S, the proﬁle αs is an
equilibrium of the one-shot game with payoﬀ function (1−δ)r(s,a)+δ
 
t∈S p(t|s) ˜ wt(s,a). The
desired continuation payoﬀ vector w will be obtained by adding an action-independent vector to
˜ w. That is, we will set wt(s,a) := ˜ wt(s,a) + Ct(s), for some vectors Ct(s) ∈ RI. For each choice
of (Ct(s)), the proﬁle αs is still a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game when continuation
payoﬀs are given by w instead of ˜ w. And it yields a payoﬀ of









We thus need to check that there exist vectors Ct(s), with a norm of the order of 1−δ, such
that the inequality λ   wt(s,a) ≤ λ   vt holds for each (s,a,t). Setting ct(s) := λ   Ct(s), basic




p(u|t)cu(t) ≤ lt(s) (S)
holds for any pair (s,t) of states, where lt(s) := mina∈A λ   (v − ˜ wt(s,a)). We are left to show
that such values of ct(s) can be found.
Feasibility of (v,x,α) in P(λ) implies that
 
s∈T
lφ(s)(s) ≥ 0 for every T ⊆ S and every per-
mutation φ over T (This is a simple rewriting of condition (ii)). As shown in the Appendix (see
Claim 3), this implies that there exists a vector l∗ = (l∗
t(s)) ∈ RS×S such that l∗
t(s) ≤ lt(s) for





φ(s)(s) = 0 for every T ⊆ S and every permutation φ over T.
Given δ < 1 and t ∈ S, we denote by µδ,t ∈ ∆(S) the expected, δ-discounted occupancy
measure of the Markov chain with initial state t. That is, µδ,t(s) is the expected discounted
frequency of visits to state s, when starting from state t. Formally,




n−1Pt (sn = s),
where Pt (sn = s) is the probability that the Markov chain visits state s in stage n.
8The proof in the general case is available upon request.








for each s,a,t,9 and is therefore a solution to (S).
We conclude by arguing brieﬂy that the norm of Ct(s) is of the order of 1 − δ, as desired.
Because lt(s) = mina∈A λ   (v − ˜ wt(s,a)) = −
1−δ
δ maxa∈A λ   xt(s,a), lt(s) is of the order of 1 − δ.
It follows from the proof of Claim 3 that l∗ is a solution for a linear program whose constraints
are linear in l = (lt(s)). Thus l∗ and ct(s) = Eµδ,t[l∗
s(s)] are also of the order of 1 − δ. It then
suﬃces to choose Ct(s) of the order of 1 − δ such that λ   Ct(s) = ct(s).
4.2 Dynamic Programming
It is sometimes argued that the results of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) can be viewed
as generalizations of dynamic programming to the case of multiple players. In the absence of any
payoﬀ-relevant state variable, this claim is diﬃcult to appreciate within the context of repeated
games. By focusing on one-player games, we show that, indeed, our characterization reduces to
the optimality equation of dynamic programming. We here assume irreducibility. Irreducibility
implies Assumption A, which in turn implies that the set of limit points of the family {vδ(s)}δ<1
as δ → 1, is independent of s, where vδ(s) is the value of the problem with initial state s.
Corollary 1 In the one-player case with irreducible transition probabilities, the set H is a sin-















holds for each s, and v = v∗ is a unique value solving (7) for some x ∈ RS.
This statement is the so-called Average Cost Optimality Equation, see Hoﬀman and Karp
(1966), Sennott (1998) or Kallenberg (2002). To get some intuition for this corollary, note
ﬁrst that, with one player, signals become irrelevant, and we might ignore them. Consider the
direction λ = 1. Furthermore, to maximize his payoﬀ, we should increase the values of xt(s) as
9The computation uses the identity Eµδ,t[f(s)] = (1 − δ)f(t) + δ
 
u∈S p(u|t)Eµδ,u[f(s)], which holds for any
map f : S → R.
18much as possible. So conjecture for a moment that all the constraints (ii) bind: for all T ⊆ S
and permutations φ : T → T,
 
s∈T xφ(s)(s) = 0. Let us then set x∗
t := xt(¯ s), for some ﬁxed state
¯ s. Then note that, for all s,t ∈ S,





where the ﬁrst two equalities use the binding constraints. Because as is a Nash equilibrium of











Using xt(s) = x∗
t − x∗
s gives the desired result. The proof below veriﬁes the conjecture, and
supplies missing steps.
Proof. By Proposition 1 (ﬁrst item), the common set of limit points of {vδ(s)}δ<1 is a subset
of H, so that H  = ∅. We ﬁrst argue that H is a singleton.
The set H is uniquely characterized by the two values k(λ), λ ∈ {−1,+1}. Since H  = ∅, one
has k(1) ≥ −k(−1).
Note now that any pair (v,x) that is feasible in P(λ,α) is also feasible in P(λ,a), for any
a ∈ AS such that αs(as) > 0 for each s. Consequently, one need only look at pure Markov
strategies in order to compute k(+1) and k(−1).
Let a ∈ AS be any such strategy. Let (v+,x+) be a feasible pair in P(+1,a), and (v−,x−) be






























for each T,φ, it follows that v+ ≤ v−. Therefore, k(+1) ≤ −k(−1), and H is a singleton. This
implies in particular that v∗ := limδ→1 vδ(s) exists, for each s ∈ S.
We will use the following claim.
19Claim 1 If a vector (xt(s)) ∈ RS×S satisﬁes
 
s∈T xφ(s)(s) = 0 for all T ⊆ S and all permuta-
tions φ : T → T, and
v




for some a = (as) ∈ AS, and all s ∈ S, then the inequality (8) holds with equality, for each s.
Proof of the Claim. Assume to the contrary that the inequality (8) is strict for some ¯ s ∈ S.






But this implies that, for all δ high enough, the δ-discounted payoﬀ induced by a exceeds vδ,
which is a contradiction.
There is a∗ ∈ AS and (xt(s)) such that (v∗,x) is feasible in P(+1,a∗). Pick a vector x∗ =
(x∗
t(s)) ∈ RS×S such that x∗
t(s) ≥ xt(s) for all s,t ∈ S, and
 
s∈T x∗
φ(s)(s) = 0 for all (T,φ).10




























Thus, the left-hand side in (9) does not exceed the right-hand side.
Let now a state s ∈ S and an action as ∈ A be given, that satisfy the inequality
v






Then, by Claim 1, applied to a := (a∗
−s,as), (10) holds with equality. This proves that (9) holds
for each s ∈ S.









Uniqueness of v∗ follows at once. Assume indeed that (7) holds for some (v,x). Set ˜ xt(s) :=
xt − xs for each s,t ∈ S. Then the pair (v, ˜ x) is feasible in P(+1) and in P(−1) as well. Hence,
−k(−1) ≤ v ≤ k(+1), so that v = v∗.
4.3 Interpretation of the Variables xt(s,y)
The variables xt(s,y) are not continuation payoﬀs per se. Rather, they are payoﬀ diﬀerences
that account both for the signal and the possible change of state. In the case of a repeated
game, they reduce to a variable of the signal alone (in the notation of FL, they are then equal to
δ
1−δ(w(y) − v)). This variable reﬂects how the continuation payoﬀ adjusts, from the current to
the following period, to provide the appropriate incentives, as a function of the realized signal.
In the case of dynamic programming, these variables collapse to a function xt(s). This is the
relative value function, as it is known in stochastic dynamic programming, and it captures the
value of the Markov decision process in state t relative to state s. It can be further decomposed
into a diﬀerence ˆ x(s) − ˆ x(t), for some function ˆ x that only depends on the current state.
While there is no reason to expect the system of inequalities (ii) to simplify in general, there
are some special cases in which it does. For instance, given our discussion above, one might sus-
pect that the payoﬀ adjustments required by the provision of incentives, on one hand, and by the
state transitions, on the other, can be disentangled whenever transitions are uninformative about
actions, conditional on the signals. Indeed, both in the case of action-independent transitions,
studied in Section 7, and in the case of perfect monitoring, one can show that these variables
can be separated as ˆ xt(s) + ˜ x(s,y), for some function ˆ x that only depends on the current and
the next state, and some ˜ x that only depends on the current state and the realized signal.
5 The Folk Theorem
FLM establish a folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring when the
signal distribution satisﬁes some rank condition. In this section, we extend their folk theorem
to stochastic games. We derive our folk theorem by investigating the programs P(λ) under a
similar rank condition and relating scores k(λ) to feasible sets and to minmax payoﬀs.
21In this section, we do not rely on Assumption A. Instead, it is more convenient to impose
state independence on feasible sets and minmax values when necessary.
Let Fδ(s) be the convex hull of the set of feasible payoﬀs of the game with initial state s ∈ S
and discount factor δ < 1. The set Fδ(s) is compact, and converges to F(s) as δ → 1, where
F(s) is the set of the limit-average feasible payoﬀs with initial state s (see, for instance, Dutta,
1995, Lemma 2). Let also mi
δ(s) be player i’s minmax payoﬀ in the game with initial state s and











where the minimum is taken over public strategies σ−i. As δ → 1, mi
δ(s) converges to mi(s),
where mi(s) is player i’s limit-average minmax payoﬀ with initial state s (see Mertens and
Neyman, 1981 and Neyman, 2003).





{v ∈ F(s) : v
i ≥ m
i(s) ∀i ∈ I}.
For a given state s ∈ S and a Markov strategy α−i = (αj)j =i, let Πi(s,α−i) be the |Ai|×|S ×Y |
matrix whose (ai,(t,y))-th component is given by p(t,y|s,ai,α−i). For s ∈ S and α = (αi), we








An action proﬁle α ∈ ×i∆(Ai) has individual full rank for player i in state s if Πi(s,α−i) has
rank |Ai|; the proﬁle α has pairwise full rank for players i and j in state s if Πij(s,α) has rank
|Ai| + |Aj| − 1. Note that |Ai| + |Aj| − 1 is the highest possible rank since Πij(s,α) always has
at least one non-trivial linear relation among its row vectors.
Assumption F1: Every pure action proﬁle has individual full rank for every player in every
state.
Assumption F2: For each state s and pair (i,j) of players, there exists a mixed action proﬁle
that has pairwise full rank for players i and j in state s.
22The assumptions are the obvious generalizations of the assumptions of individual and pairwise
full rank made by FLM. Note that Assumptions F1 and F2 are weaker than the rank assump-
tions of Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010). Fudenberg and Yamamoto require that players can
statistically identify each others’ deviations via actual signals y, whereas we allow players to
make inferences from the observed state as well.
Example 1 in Section 3.2 provides a useful illustration of the diﬀerence. In this example, there
are no public signals, so Fudenberg and Yamamoto’s rank assumptions are not satisﬁed. On the
other hand, Assumptions F1 and F2 are satisﬁed if pL  = pR.11 If pL = pR, then incentives
cannot be provided for players to play R, so that the unique PPE payoﬀ is (1,1).
With the above assumptions, we characterize k(λ) in terms of feasible and minmax payoﬀs
only. Let ei denote the i-th coordinate basis vector in RI.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions F1-F2, one has the following.
1. If λ ∈ S1 and λ  = −ei for any i, then k(λ) = mins maxw∈F(s)λ   w.
2. k(−ei) = −maxs mi(s) for any i.
While this lemma characterizes the value of the optimization program for each direction λ
under Assumptions F1-F2, the algorithm can be adapted to the purpose of computing feasible
and minmax payoﬀs (in public strategies) without these assumptions. In the ﬁrst case, it suﬃces
to ignore the incentive constraints (i) in the program P(λ) and to take the intersection of the
resulting half-spaces. In the second case, it suﬃces to focus on the incentives of the minmaxed
player i, and to take as direction the coordinate vector −ei. The proofs follow similar lines, and
details are available from the authors.
Combined with Proposition 2, Lemma 2 implies the following folk theorem, which extends
both the folk theorem for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring by FLM and the folk
theorem for stochastic games with observable actions by Dutta (1995).12
Theorem 2 (Folk Theorem) Under Assumptions F1-F2, it holds that H = F ∗. In particular,
if F(s) = F and mi(s) = mi for all s ∈ S, and F ∗ = {v ∈ F : vi ≥ mi ∀i ∈ I} has non-empty
interior, then Eδ(s) converges to F ∗ as δ → 1, for any s ∈ S.
11 When the set of available actions depends on the state, as in Example 1, the deﬁnitions of full rank must be
adjusted in the obvious way. Namely, we say that α has individual full rank for player i at state s if the rank of
Πi(s,α−i) is no less than the number of actions available to player i at state s. A similar modiﬁcation applies to
pairwise full rank.
12Note that Dutta (1995, Theorem 9.3) shows that full-dimensionality can be weakened to payoﬀ asymmetry











Figure 3: The limit set of PPE payoﬀs in Example 1
It is known that, under irreducibility, F(s) and mi(s) are independent of state s. In Example
1 in Section 3.2, irreducibility is satisﬁed if pL,pR  = 1. Dutta (1995) provides somewhat weaker
assumptions on the transition function that guarantee the state-independence property. But
these assumptions are not necessary: the limit set of feasible payoﬀs is independent of the initial
state as long as at least one of these probabilities is strictly less than one, and the minmax payoﬀ
is always independent of the initial state.
To illustrate this folk theorem, let for instance pL = 1 − pR = 1/10 in Example 1, so that
playing action L gives player i both his highest reward in that state and the highest probability
of transiting to the other state, in which his reward is for sure higher than in his own state. The
folk theorem holds here. The set of PPE payoﬀs is then the convex hull of (1,1), (3/2,3/2),
(55/28,1) and (1,55/28). See Figure 3.
6 Short-run Players
It is trivial to extend the algorithm to the case in which some players are short-run. Following
FL, suppose that players i = 1,...,L, L ≤ I, are long-run players, whose objective is to maximize
the average discounted sum of rewards, with discount factor δ < 1. Players j ∈ SR := {L +
1,...,I} are short-run players, each representative of which plays only once. For each state








be the correspondence that maps any mixed action proﬁle (α1,...,αL) for the long-run players
to the corresponding static equilibria for the short-run players. That is, for each α ∈ graphB(s),
24P NP
H τ,1 − τ − c 0,0
C 1,−c 0,0
Figure 4: A Political Game
and each j > L, αj maximizes rj(s, ,α−j). The characterization goes through if we “ignore” the
short-run players and simply modify (i) by requiring that v be a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the
game Γ(s,x) for the long-run players, achieved by some αs ∈ graphB(s) for each s.
6.1 An Example
We now provide an illustration of the algorithm that attempts to tread the thin line between
accessibility and triviality. Consider the following game, loosely inspired by Dixit, Grossman and
Gul (2000) and Phelan (2006).
There are two parties. In any given period, one of the two parties is in power. Party i = 1,2
is in power in state i. Only the party in power and the households take actions. Households can
produce (P) at cost c with value one, or not produce (NP). There is a continuum of households,
and we treat them therefore as one short-run player. The government in power can either
honor (H) or conﬁscate (C). Honoring means choosing a ﬁxed tax rate τ and getting therefore
revenues τµi, where µi is the fraction of households who produce in state i. By conﬁscating, the
government appropriates all output. This gives rise to the payoﬀ matrix given by Figure 4.
It is assumed that 1 − τ > c > 0. Actions are not observed, but parties that honor are more
likely to remain in power. More precisely, if the state is i, and the realized action is H, the state
remains i with probability pH; if the action is C, it remains the same with probability pL, with
0 < pL < pH < 1. We call this game Example 2.




   
   
[0,1] if αi = c/(1 − τ),
{0} if αi < c/(1 − τ),
{1} if αi > c/(1 − τ),
where αi is the probability that party i plays H. The feasible set F is independent of the initial
















These expressions are intuitive. Note that the highest symmetric payoﬀ involves both parties
conﬁscating as much as possible, subject to the constraint that the households are still willing
to produce. The payoﬀ from conﬁscating at this rate is 1 − c, and since time is equally spent
between both parties, the resulting payoﬀ is ((1 − c)/2,(1 − c)/2). Consider next the case in
which one party always conﬁscates, so that households never produce in that state, while the
other party conﬁscates at the highest rate consistent with all the households producing. The
invariant distribution assigns probability (1−pL)/(2− ¯ p−pL) to that state, and the asymmetric
payoﬀ follows. Finally, the minmax payoﬀ of each party is zero, which is an equilibrium payoﬀ.
Theorem 1 applies to this game. Let us compute the equilibrium payoﬀ set as δ → 1. The
optimization program with weights λ = (λ1,λ2) involves eight variables xi
t(s), i = 1,2, s,t = 1,2,
satisfying the constraints
λ   x1(1) ≤ 0, λ   x2(2) ≤ 0, λ   (x2(1) + x1(2)) ≤ 0, (11)
in addition to the requirement that αi be a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(i,x), i = 1,2.
Consider a vector λ > 0. Note that the constraints (11) must bind: Indeed, note that, because
player i does not make a choice in state −i, the Nash equilibrium requirements (i.e. constraints
(i) in program P(λ)) give us at most three constraints per player (his preference ordering in
the state in which he takes an action, and the fact that he gets the same payoﬀ in the other
state). In addition to the three constraints (11), this gives us nine constraints, and there are
eight variables xi
t(s). One can check that, if one of the three constraints is slack, we can increase
the payoﬀ of a player by changing the values of xi
t(s), while satisfying all binding constraints.
Observe now that we must have µi ∈ {0,1}, i = 1,2. Indeed, suppose that µi ∈ (0,1), for
some i, so that αi ≥ c/(1 − τ). Then we can increase µi and decrease xi
i(i),xi
i(−i) so as to
keep player i’s payoﬀ constant, while keeping him indiﬀerent between both actions (which he
must be since µi ∈ (0,1)). Given these observations, this now becomes a standard problem
that can be solved by enumeration. Note, however, that we do not need to consider the case
α1 > c/(1−τ),α2 > c/(1−τ): if this were the case, we could decrease both these probabilities in
such a way as to maintain the relative time spent in each state the same, while increasing both
players’ payoﬀs in their own state (because µi = 1 is feasible as long as αi ≥ c/(1 − τ)).
26-
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Figure 5: The limit set of equilibrium payoﬀs in Example 2
It is not hard to guess that the optimal action proﬁle for λ1 = λ2 > 0 is to set αi = c/(1−τ),
i = 1,2 (and, as mentioned, µi = 1), and we obtain the highest feasible symmetric payoﬀ. If
we consider a coordinate direction, say λ1 > 0,λ2 = 0, it is intuitive that households will not
produce in state 2, and party 2 will conﬁscate with suﬃcient probability for such behavior to be
optimal, and party 1 will conﬁscate at the highest rate consistent with households producing.
Party 1 must not be willing to either conﬁscate for sure (which increases his reward when he
does) or honor for sure (which increases the fraction of time spent in his state, when his reward
is positive), and this means that his payoﬀ cannot exceed
˜ v := min
 
pH − τpL − (1 − τ)
pH − pL ,
(1 − pL)(pH − τpL)
(2 − pL)(pH − pL)
 
,
assuming this is positive. It follows that the limit equilibrium payoﬀ set is given by H = {v ∈
F : 0 ≤ vi ≤ ˜ v ∀i = 1,2} if ˜ v > 0, and the singleton payoﬀ (0,0) otherwise. Note that, from
the ﬁrst argument deﬁning ˜ v, the payoﬀ set shrinks to (0,0) as pH → pL, as is to be expected: if
conﬁscation cannot be statistically detected, households will prefer not to produce. See Figure
5 for an illustration in the case in which ˜ v > (1 − c)/2.
6.2 A Characterization with Full Rank
The equilibrium payoﬀ set obtained in Example 2 is reminiscent of the results of FL for
repeated games with long-run and short-run players. We provide here an extension of their
result to the case of stochastic games, but maintain full rank assumptions for long-run players.
One of the main insights of FL, which is an extension of Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin
27(1990), is that achieving some payoﬀs may require the long-run players to randomize on the
equilibrium path, so as to induce short-run players to take particular actions. This means that
long-run player i must be indiﬀerent between all actions in the support of his mixture, and so
continuation payoﬀs must adjust so that his payoﬀ cannot exceed the one he would achieve from
the action in this support that yields him the lowest payoﬀ.
For a direction λ  = ±ei, the pairwise full rank condition ensures that the above requirement is
not restrictive, that is, we only need to care about the feasibility given that short-run players take
static best responses. However, for the coordinate directions λ = ±ei, since we cannot adjust
long-run player i’s continuation payoﬀ without aﬀecting the score, the optimal mixed action of
player i is determined taking into account both the eﬀect on the short-run players’ actions and
the cost of letting player i take that action.
The same applies here. We ﬁrst deal with non-coordinate directions. To incorporate short-
run players’ incentives, we deﬁne Fδ(s) as the convex hull of the set of long-run players’ feasible
payoﬀs of the game with initial state s and discount factor δ, where we require that the players
play actions from graphB(t) whenever the current state is t. The set F(s) of long-run players’
limit-average feasible payoﬀs is deﬁned similarly. The set Fδ(s) converges to F(s) as δ → 1.
Assumption F3: For each state s and pair (i,j) of long-run players, every mixed action proﬁle
in graphB(s) has pairwise full rank for players i and j in state s.
Similarly to Lemma 2, we have the following.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption F3, one has the following.





s∈S F(s) : −k(−ei) ≤ vi ≤ k(ei) ∀i = 1,...,L
 
.
Theorem 1 applies here. Namely, if Assumption A is satisﬁed and H has non-empty interior,
then Eδ(s) converges to H as δ → 1, for every s ∈ S.
Lemma 3 leaves open how to determine k(±ei). Under Assumption F3, since every mixed
action proﬁle has individual full rank, we can control each long-run player’s payoﬀs and induce
him to play any action. This implies that, without loss of generality, in program P(±ei), we can
ignore the incentives of long-run players other than player i without aﬀecting the score.
28We can obtain a further simpliﬁcation if Assumption F3 is strengthened to full monitoring.




where the supremum is taken over all α = (αs)s∈S ∈ ×sgraphB(s), vi ∈ R, and ¯ xi : S → RS
such that




























Here vi is equal to the minimum of player i’s payoﬀs, where ai
s is taken over the support of
player i’s mixed action αi
s. If vi were larger than the minimum, then we would not be able to
provide incentives for player i to be indiﬀerent between all actions in the support of αi
s. Note
that this program is simpler than P(ei) in that ¯ xi depends on the current and next states, but
is independent of realized actions.




where the inﬁmum is taken over all α ∈ ×sgraphB(s), vi ∈ R, and ¯ xi : S → RS such that



























See also Section 4.2 for the discussion of the related, one-player case.
7 Action-independent Transitions
Our characterization can be used to obtain qualitative insights. We here discuss the case
in which the evolution of the state is independent of players’ actions. To let the transitions
29probabilities of the states vary, while keeping the distributions of signals ﬁxed, we assume that
the transition probabilities can be written as a product p(t|s) × π(y|s,a). In other words, and
in any period, the next state t and the public signal y are drawn independently, and the action
proﬁle only aﬀects the distribution of y.
In this setup, it is intuitively clear that the (limit) set of PPE payoﬀs should only depend on p
through its invariant measure, µ. If the signal structure is rich enough and the folk theorem holds,
this is straightforward. Indeed, the (limit) set of feasible payoﬀs is equal to
 
s∈S µsr(s,∆(A)),
and a similar formula holds for the (limit) minmax.
We prove below that this observation remains valid even when the folk theorem fails to hold.
The proof is based on our characterization, and providing a direct proof of this fact does not
seem to be an easy task.
In this subsection, we ﬁx a signal structure π : S × A → ∆(Y ), and we let the transition
probability p over states vary. To stress the dependence, and given a (unit) direction λ ∈ S1, and
a mixed proﬁle α, we denote by Pp(λ,α) the optimization program P(λ,α), when the transition
probability over states is set to p : S → ∆(S). We also denote by kp(λ,α) the value of Pp(λ,α),
and by H(p) the intersection of all half-spaces {v ∈ RI : λ v ≤ supα kp(λ,α)} obtained by letting
λ vary.
Proposition 3 Let p and q be two irreducible transition functions over S, with the same invari-
ant measure µ. Then H(p) = H(q).
This implies that, for the purpose of studying the limit equilibrium payoﬀ set in the case of
transitions that are action-independent, one might as well assume that the state is drawn i.i.d.
across periods. In that case, the stochastic game can be viewed as a repeated game, in which
player i’s actions in each period are maps from S to Ai. The program P(λ,α) can then be
shown to be equivalent to the corresponding program of FL. One direction is a simple change of
variable. The other direction relies on Lemma 1.
8 Concluding Comments
This paper shows that some of the methods developed for the study of repeated games can
be generalized to stochastic games, and can be applied to obtain qualitative insights as δ → 1.
This, of course, leaves many questions unanswered. First, as mentioned, the results derived
here rely on δ → 1. While not much is known in the general case for repeated games either, there
30still are a few results available in the literature (on the impact of the quality of information, for
instance). It is then natural to ask whether those results can be extended to stochastic games.
Within the realm of asymptotic analysis, it also appears important to generalize our results
to broader settings. The characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set and the folk theorem
established in this paper rely on some strong assumptions. The set of actions, signals and
states are all assumed to be ﬁnite. We suspect that the characterization can be generalized to
the case of richer action and signal sets, but extending the result to richer state spaces raises
signiﬁcant challenges. Yet this is perhaps the most important extension: even with ﬁnitely many
states, beliefs about those states aﬀect the players’ incentives when states are no longer common
knowledge, as is often the case in applications in which players have private information, and
these beliefs must therefore be treated as state variables themselves.
Finally, there is an alternative possible asymptotic analysis that is of signiﬁcant interest. As
is the case with public signals (see the concluding remarks of FLM), an important caveat is in
order regarding the interpretation of our limit results. It is misleading to think of δ → 1 as
periods growing shorter, as transitions are kept ﬁxed throughout the analysis. If transitions are
determined by physical constraints, then these probabilities should be adjusted as periods grow
shorter. As a result, feasible payoﬀs will not be independent of the initial state. It remains to
be seen whether such an analysis is equally tractable.
319 Proofs
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let δ < 1 be given. To show the ﬁrst statement, for each state s, choose an equilibrium payoﬀ
vs that maximizes the inner product λ   w for w ∈ Eδ(s). Consider a PPE σ with payoﬀs (vs).
For each initial state s, let αs = σ(s) be the mixed moves played in stage 1, and wt(s,y) be the
continuation payoﬀs following y, if in state t at stage 2. Note that λ   wt(s,y) ≤ λ   vt for y ∈ Y
and s,t ∈ S. By construction, for each s ∈ S, αs is a Nash equilibrium, with payoﬀ vs, of the
game with payoﬀ function




Set xt(s,y) := δ
1−δ(wt(s,y) − vs). Observe that αs is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(s,x),
with payoﬀ vs. Next, let ¯ s be a state that minimizes λ   vs, and ˜ xt(s,y) := xt(s,y) + v¯ s − vs for
each s,t ∈ S, y ∈ Y . Then αs is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(s, ˜ x), with payoﬀ v¯ s. On the other
hand, for each T,φ,ψ, one has
 
s∈T



















λ   xφ(s)(s,ψ(s)) +
 
s∈T
(λ   v¯ s − λ   vs) ≤ 0.
Therefore, (v¯ s, ˜ x) is feasible in P(λ). Thus




λ   w.
The second statement follows immediately from the ﬁrst statement.
329.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since Z is a compact set contained in the interior of H, there exists η > 0 such that
Zη := {z ∈ R
I : d(z,Z) ≤ η}
is also a compact set contained in the interior of H. We start with a technical statement.
Lemma 4 There are ε0 > 0 and a bounded set K ⊂ RI × RS×Y ×S×I of (v,x) such that the
following holds. For every z ∈ Zη and λ ∈ S1, there exists (v,x) ∈ K such that (v,x) is feasible
in P(λ) and λ   z + ε0 < λ   v.
Proof. Given z ∈ Zη and since Zη is contained in the interior of H, one has λ   z < k(λ) for
every λ ∈ S1. Therefore, there exists a feasible pair (v,x) in P(λ) such that λ   z < λ   v. The
conclusion of the lemma states that (v,x) can be chosen within a bounded set, independently of
λ and of z.13
Choose ˜ ε > 0 such that λ   z + ˜ ε < λ   v, and deﬁne
˜ xt(s,y) = xt(s,y) − ˜ ελ, ˜ v = v − ˜ ελ
for each s,t ∈ S and y ∈ Y . Observe that for each s ∈ S, αs is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ(s, ˜ x), with payoﬀ ˜ v. Note in addition that
 
s∈T
λ   ˜ xφ(s)(s,ψ(s)) ≤ −˜ ε|T| < 0 for each T,φ and
ψ. Therefore, for every ˜ z close enough to z, for every ˜ λ close enough to λ, the pair (˜ v, ˜ x) is
feasible in P(˜ λ) and ˜ λ   ˜ z < ˜ λ   ˜ v. The result then follows, by compactness of Zη and of S1.
In the sequel, we let κ0 > 0 be such that  x  ≤ κ0 and  z −v  ≤ κ0 for every (v,x) ∈ K and




− 2κ0|S| > 0.
Next, choose ¯ δ < 1 to be large enough so that (n/2)2(1−δ) ≤ |S| and 1−δn−1 ≥ (n−1)(1−δ)/2




13Note however that, for given z and λ, the set of feasible pairs (v,x) in P(λ) such that λ z < λ v is typically
unbounded.
33Given a map w : Hn → RI which associates to any history of length n a payoﬀ vector, we
denote by Γn(s,w;δ) the δ-discounted, (n − 1)-stage game, with ﬁnal payoﬀs w.
The following proposition is essential for the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 For every direction λ ∈ S1, every z ∈ Zη and every discount factor δ ≥ ¯ δ, there
exist continuation payoﬀs w : Hn → RI such that:
C1 For each s, z is a PPE payoﬀ of the game Γn(s,w;δ).
C2 One has  w(h) − z  ≤ (1 − δ)κ for every h ∈ Hn.
C3 One has λ   w(h) ≤ λ   z − (1 − δ)ε for every h ∈ Hn.
Proof. Let λ, z and δ be given as stated. Pick a mixed proﬁle α = (αs)s∈S and (v,x) ∈ K
that is feasible in P(λ) such that, for each s ∈ S, αs is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(s,x), with payoﬀ
v, and λ   z + ε0 < λ   v.
Given s,t ∈ S, and y ∈ Y , set
φt(s,y) = v +
1 − ¯ δ
¯ δ
xt(s,y).
For each history h of length not exceeding n, we deﬁne w(h) by induction on the length of h.
The deﬁnition of w follows FL. If h = (s1), we set w(h) = z. For k ≥ 1 and hk+1 ∈ Hk+1, we set
w(hk+1) =
δ − ¯ δ
δ(1 − ¯ δ)
w(hk) +
¯ δ(1 − δ)







where hk is the restriction of hk+1 to the ﬁrst k stages.
Let k ≥ 1, and hk ∈ Hk. As in FL, using (12), αsk is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game
with payoﬀ function






with payoﬀ w(hk). By the one-shot deviation principle, it follows that Markov strategy proﬁle α
is a PPE of the game Γn(s1,w;δ), with payoﬀ z (for each initial state s1). This proves C1.
34We now turn to C2. Let hn ∈ Hn be given and let hk (k ≤ n) denote the restriction of hn to
the ﬁrst k stages. Observe that
w(hk+1) − v =
δ − ¯ δ
δ(1 − ¯ δ)
(w(hk) − v) +
¯ δ(1 − δ)
δ(1 − ¯ δ)
 












for any k ≤ n − 1. Therefore,
w(hn) − v =
1








w(hn) − z =
1 − δn−1








 w(hn) − z  ≤
1 − δn−1











2(n − 1)(1 − δ)
¯ δn−1 κ0 = (1 − δ)κ.
This proves C2.
We ﬁnally prove that C3 holds as well. The proof makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let x1,...,xm ∈ [−1,1] be such that
m  
k=1








Proof. If m is even, the sum
 m
k=1 δk−1xk is highest if xk = 1 for k ≤ m
2 , and xk = −1 for
k > m
2 . If m is odd, the sum is maximized by setting xk = 1 for k < m+1
2 , xk = 0 for k = m+1
2
and xk = −1 for k > m+1
2 . In both cases, the sum is at most 1−2δm/2+δm
1−δ .
Set m0 = 0, l1 + 1 := min{k ≥ 1 : sm = sk for some m > k} (min∅ = +∞), and m1 + 1 :=
max{k ≤ n : sk = sl1+1}. Next, as long as lj < +∞, deﬁne lj+1 + 1 := min{k ≥ mj + 1 : sm =
35sk for some m > k} and mj+1 +1 := max{k ≤ n : sk = slj+1+1}. Let J the largest integer j with
lj < +∞.
Since slj+1 = smj+1, one has λ  
 mj






























with 1 ≥ u1 ≥ v1 ≥     ≥ uJ ≥ vJ ≥ δn/2. Such a sum is maximized when J = 1, u1 = 1 and
v1 = δn/2. It is then equal to (1−δn/2)2. On the other hand, there are at most |S| stages k with


























Substituting this inequality into (13), one obtains
λ   w(hn) ≤ λ   z +
1 − δn−1






k−1λ   xsk+1(sk,yk)







= λ   z − ε
1 − δ
δn−1 ≤ λ   z − ε(1 − δ)
as claimed.
36Let ¯ ¯ δ < 1 be large enough so that (1−¯ ¯ δ)κ ≤ η and (1−¯ ¯ δ)κ2 ≤ 2εη. The next lemma exploits
the smoothness of Zη.
Lemma 6 For every z ∈ Zη and every δ ≥ ¯ ¯ δ, there exists a direction λ ∈ S1 such that, if w ∈ RI
satisﬁes  w − z  ≤ (1 − δ)κ and λ   w ≤ λ   z − (1 − δ)ε, then one has w ∈ Zη.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of Zη, for each z ∈ Zη, there exists z0 ∈ Z such that  z − z0  ≤ η.
Let λ := (z − z0)/ z − z0 . (If z0 = z, then take any unit vector.) Then, for any w, one has
 w − z0 
2 =  z − z0 
2 + 2(z − z0)   (w − z) +  w − z 
2
≤  z − z0 
2 − 2(1 − δ)ε z − z0  + (1 − δ)
2κ
2.
The last expression is a quadratic form, which is maximized when  z − z0  = 0 or  z −z0  = η.
Therefore,
 w − z0 
2 ≤ max{(1 − δ)
2κ
2,η




because δ ≥ ¯ ¯ δ. Thus  w − z0  ≤ η, hence w ∈ Zη.
We here prove Proposition 2. Fix any δ ≥ max{¯ δ, ¯ ¯ δ}. For any z ∈ Zη, we construct a public
strategy σ : H → ×i∆(Ai) and continuation payoﬀs w : H → Zη inductively as follows. Set
w(h) = z ∈ Zη for any h = (s1) ∈ H1. For k ≥ 1 and h ∈ H(n−1)(k−1)+1, given that w(h) ∈ Zη,
by Proposition 4, there exist continuation payoﬀs wh : Hn → RI that satisfy C1 (that is, there
exists a PPE of Γn(s(n−1)(k−1)+1,wh;δ), with payoﬀ w(h)), C2 and C3. Let σ prescribe the PPE
of Γn(s(n−1)(k−1)+1,wh;δ) for the block of periods between (n − 1)(k − 1) + 1 and (n − 1)k. For
any ˜ h ∈ H(n−1)k+1 whose restriction to the ﬁrst (n − 1)(k − 1) + 1 periods is equal to h, let
w(˜ h) = wh(n˜ h), where n˜ h is the restriction of ˜ h to the last n periods. It follows from C2, C3
and Lemma 6 that w(˜ h) ∈ Zη. By the one-shot deviation principle and C1, for any initial state
s, the constructed strategy σ is a PPE of the whole (inﬁnite-horizon) game, with payoﬀ z. Thus
Z ⊂ Zη ⊆ Eδ(s) for any s ∈ S.
9.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the two statements in turn. We start with the ﬁrst one, and consider the following
two cases: λ  = ±ei for any i, and λ = ei.
37Suppose that λ  = ±ei for any i. Let δ < 1 be given. For each state s, choose a feasible
payoﬀ γs ∈ Fδ(s) that maximizes the inner product λ   γs. Let as ∈ A be the proﬁle of moves
played in stage 1, and wt(s,y) ∈ Fδ(t) be the continuation payoﬀs following y, if in state t at
stage 2. Note that λ   wt(s,y) ≤ λ   γt for y ∈ Y , s,t ∈ S. By construction, for each s ∈ S,
γs = (1 − δ)r(s,as) + δ
 
t∈S,y∈Y p(t,y|s,as)wt(s,y).
Fix ε > 0 arbitrarily. From Assumption F2 and Lemma 6.2 of FLM, there exists an open
and dense set of proﬁles each of which has pairwise full rank for all pairs of players. Therefore,
for each s ∈ S, there exist ˆ γs, ˆ αs, and ˆ wt(s,y) such that λ   ˆ wt(s,y) ≤ λ   ˆ γt for y ∈ Y , t ∈ S,
ˆ γs = (1 − δ)r(s, ˆ αs) + δ
 
t∈S,y∈Y p(t,y|s, ˆ αs) ˆ wt(s,y), λ   ˆ γs ≥ λ   γs − ε, and ˆ αs has pairwise full
rank for all pairs of players in state s.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, there exist ˜ xt(s,y) (y ∈ Y , s,t ∈ S) and v ∈ RI such
that λ   v = mins λ   ˆ γs,
v = r(s, ˆ αs) +
 
t





˜ xφ(s)(s,ψ (s)) ≤ 0,
for each T ⊆ S, for each permutation φ : T → T and each map ψ : T → Y . For each s ∈ S,
although ˆ αs is not a Nash equilibrium of Γ(s, ˜ x), since ˆ αs satisﬁes pairwise full rank, there exist
ˆ xt(s,y) for y ∈ Y and t ∈ S such that ˆ αs is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(s, ˜ x + ˆ x) with payoﬀ v, and
such that λ  ˆ xt(s,y) = 0 for each y ∈ Y and t ∈ S. With xt(s,y) := ˜ xt(s,y)+ ˆ xt(s,y), the payoﬀ





for each T ⊆ S, each permutation φ : T → T, and each map ψ : T → Y .
It follows that
k(λ) ≥ λ   v = min
s∈S




λ   w − ε.



















µα,s(t)λ   r(t,αt),
where µα,s(t) is the long-run frequency of state t under the Markov chain induced by α with












µα(t)λ   r(t,αt),
where the minimum is taken over all invariant measures of the Markov chain induced by α.
By Lemma 1, for each α, one has
 
t∈S
µα(t)λ   r(t,αt) ≥ k(λ,α).





λ   w ≥ sup
α
k(λ,α) = k(λ).
Suppose next that λ = ei for some i. By replacing Assumption F2 with Assumption F1
and Lemma 6.2 of FLM with Lemma 6.3 of FLM, a similar argument establishes k(ei) =
mins∈S maxw∈F(s)wi. This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst statement.

























for every s ∈ S, where α−i
s is the mixed moves played in stage 1 (as a function of the initial state)
and wi
t(s,y) is a continuation payoﬀ for player i when player i takes a best-response against σ−i
from stage 2 onward. Note that wi
t(s,y) ≥ mi
δ(t) for each t. Therefore, by replacing Assumption
F2 with Assumption F1 and Lemma 6.2 of FLM with Lemma 6.3 of FLM, a similar argument










39where αi and α−i are Markov strategies and µα,s(t) is the long-run frequency of state t under the













where the maximum is taken over all invariant measures of the Markov chain induced by α.
Let (˜ αi,α−i) be an arbitrary Markov strategy, and ε > 0. Then there exists (v,x) that is
feasible in P(−ei,(˜ αi,α−i)) and −vi > k(−ei, ˜ αi,α−i)−ε. It follows from the incentive constraints








































This concludes the proof of the second statement.
9.4 Proof for the Characterization with Full Monitoring
We ﬁrst show that P(ei) and Qi





























for every s ∈ S and ai
s ∈ support(αi











































Next, set ¯ xi
t(s) := ˜ xi
t(s)+vi−˜ vi
s. Since ˜ vi
s ≥ vi for every s ∈ S, we have that (α,vi, ¯ xi) is feasible
in Qi
+.
Conversely, take any (α,vi, ¯ xi) feasible in Qi
+. For each s ∈ S and a−i






























s) (note that the right-hand side is independent of a−i




be suﬃciently small if ai
s / ∈ support(αi










s), we have that (α,vi,v−i,xi,x−i) is feasible in P(ei). (v−i and x−i are
chosen to give incentives for players −i to play α−i.)
The equivalence between P(−ei) and Qi
− follows similarly.
9.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We let a unit direction λ ∈ S1, and a mixed proﬁle α be given. We prove that for each
feasible pair (v,x) in Pp(λ,α), there is z : S × Y → RS×I such that (v,z) is a feasible pair in
Pq(λ,α). This implies kp(λ,α) = kq(λ,α), and hence the result. The proof uses the following
two observations.
Denote by P (resp. Q) the S × S matrix whose (s,t)-th entry is p(t|s) (resp. q(t|s)).
Claim 2 The ranges of the two linear maps (with matrices) Id − P and Id − Q are equal.
Proof of the Claim. Assume that q is aperiodic. Let be given a vector ξ ∈ RS in the
range of Id − P. Hence, there is ψ ∈ RS, such that ξ = ψ − Pψ. Hence,  µ,ξ  = 0. Since q is
an irreducible transition function with invariant measure µ, the vector Qnξ converges as n → ∞
to the constant vector, whose components are all equal to  µ,ξ  = 0. Moreover, the convergence




nξ is well-deﬁned, and
solves ˜ ψ = ξ + Q˜ ψ. This proves the result.14
14The proof in the case where q is periodic is similar. As in the aperiodic case, the inﬁnite sum in ˜ ψ is
well-deﬁned.
41Claim 3 Let a vector c = (ct(s)) ∈ RS×S be given, such that the inequality
 
s∈T cφ(s)(s) ≤ 0
holds for every T ⊆ S, and every permutation φ over T. Then there exists a vector c∗ = (c∗
t(s)) ∈
RS×S such that (i) c∗ ≥ c (componentwise) and (ii)
 
s∈T c∗
φ(s)(s) = 0, for every T ⊆ S and
every permutation φ over T.








, where the sum
ranges over all (T,φ) such that T ⊆ S and φ is a permutation over T, and the supremum is taken
over all g such that (i) g ≥ c and (ii)
 
s∈T gφ(s)(s) ≤ 0, for every T ⊆ S and every permutation
φ over T. This program is bounded and c is a feasible point, hence there is an optimal solution,





φ(s)(s) < 0 (14)
for some T and some φ. It must then be the case that for each s ∈ T, there exists some set Ts ⊆ S
containing s, and some permutation φs over Ts with φs(s) = φ(s), and such that the constraint
 
t∈Ts c∗
φs(t)(t) ≤ 0 is binding. (Otherwise indeed, a small increase in the value of c∗
φ(s)(s) would















φs(t)(t) > 0. (15)




t∈Ts,t =s(t,φs(t)) (where any edge
that appears more than once is repeated) is a collection of disjoint cycles. Hence (15) is in
contradiction with the fact that c∗ is feasible.
To see this last claim, observe that for each state s ∈ T, the edges (t,φs(t)), where t ∈ Ts,
t  = s, form a directed path from φ(s) to s. Hence, the union over s of these paths is a union of
disjoint cycles.
We turn to the proof of Proposition 3. Let (v,x) be a feasible pair in Pp(λ,α). For (s,t) ∈ S,




φ(s)(s) = 0, for
42every T ⊆ S and every permutation φ over T, there is a vector ¯ c∗ ∈ RS, such that c∗
t(s) = ¯ c∗
t −¯ c∗
s
for every s,t ∈ S.
Next, by Claim 2, there is ¯ d ∈ RS, such that (Id − P)¯ c∗ = (Id − Q)¯ d. For s,t ∈ S, set



























for any i,s,t,y. We claim that (v,z) is feasible in Pq(λ,α), as desired.
By construction, one has
λ   zt(s,y) = dt(s) +
 
u∈S
p(u|s)(λ   xu(s,y) − c
∗
u(s)) ≤ dt(s),
hence the vector z satisﬁes all linear constraints in Pq(λ,α).







































holds for any a ∈ S. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
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